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Evidence on the Limits of Arbitrage:
Short Sales, Price Pressure, and the Stock Price Response to
Convertible Bond Calls
Abstract
The announcement of a convertible bond call is associated with an average contem-
poraneous abnormal stock price decline of 1.75% and an ensuing price recovery in the
conversion period. A price fall and the subsequent recovery suggest price pressure as
the explanation for the announcement eect.
In a perfect capital market the option to convert will not be exercised early. The
increase in the number of shares outstanding will then occur at the end of the con-
version period and not at the earlier announcement date. This study's focus is on the
increase in supply that occurs at the announcement day due to short selling of the
calling company's stock. Two groups actively engage in short selling in anticipation of,
and response to, a convertible bond call. Arbitrageurs buy the convertible and short
stock against the equity component of their bond position. Underwriters hedge their
exposure by shorting stock.
This study examines the relation between short selling around a call announcement,
the number of new shares to be issued upon conversion, the predictability of the call,
the price reaction to the call announcement, and the subsequent price recovery. We
conclude that short selling induced price pressure explains at least part of the stock
price response to calls. The study's results suggest that an understanding of the stock
price response to convertible bond calls actually requires an understanding of optimal
compensation schemes, risk aversion, and agency problems within the rms that short
sell in response to calls. When short selling by arbitrageurs and underwriters tem-
porarily depresses prices by 1.75%, what are the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) \limits of
arbitrage" that give rise to the benet of hedging by selling such underpriced stock?
1
1 Introduction
The announcement of an in-the-money convertible bond call is associated with an average contem-
poraneous abnormal stock price decline of 1.75% and an ensuing price recovery in the conversion
period. This paper will argue and provide evidence that the decline in stock prices is due to
investors short selling the underlying stock at or around the call announcement. Two types of
investors may have strong incentives to hedge their equity exposure by short selling at the time of
the call. First, the convertible hedge desks of investment banks will try to lock in arbitrage prots
by buying the called convertible bond and short selling the underlying stock. Second, a possible
underwriter of the call will short sell in order to hedge the equity risk associated with the call.
The short selling of stock by these two types of investors is at least in part causing the short-run
price pressure. However, the willingness to bear the transaction costs and the price impact costs
of selling such underpriced stock is the consequence of risk aversion and agency problems within
investment banks and is taken as evidence on the limits of arbitrage.
In their paper `The Limits of Arbitrage' Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider professional arbi-
trageurs and describe important implications of the dierence between textbook arbitrage and what
they denote real arbitrage. Textbook arbitrage is generally argued to ensure that prices are close
to fundamentals and hence to ensure that markets are eÆcient. The standard argument for this is
that many small investors are seeking arbitrage opportunities in the market and as every investor
has only a small amount of capital at stake, they are eectively risk neutral. However, in many
cases the evaluation of existing arbitrage opportunities requires highly specialized knowledge. In
addition, real arbitrage will always entail some risk and require capital.
1
Therefore, in reality the
arbitrageurs will only make money on average, and may under certain circumstances need addi-
tional capital to either execute additional trades or cover possible losses. This means that many real
arbitrage activities will only be performed by a few professional arbitrageurs having the required
knowledge and access to the necessary capital. Such professional arbitrageurs will be large and
highly specialized investment banks. Furthermore, the capital requirements can create an agency
relationship between `the knowledge' and `the capital'. The agency relationship can exist at several
levels within the professional arbitrageur, or between the professional arbitrageur and the investors
providing the capital at stake.
2
Because capital is fundamental in real arbitrage, the professional
1
For example, Tuckman and Vila (1992) show that holding costs is enough to make perfectly hedged arbitrage
strategies risky. Similarly, Ponti (1996) documents the importance of other arbitrage costs.
2
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) provide a more detailed description of such agency problems.
2
arbitrageur will fear the situation where the providers of capital start withdrawing capital. The
risk aversion and the agency relationship described cause limits of arbitrage. This is because both
phenomena will make the arbitrageurs less eective in exploiting real arbitrage opportunities and
thereby less eective in keeping markets eÆcient.
3
Anticipated or realized calls of convertible bonds provide a case where such real arbitrage op-
portunities can exist. As explained in section 3.3 the original holders of convertible bonds (such as
convertible bond funds) wish to sell the convertible bonds at anticipated or realized calls. The buy-
ers will typically be arbitrageurs such as the convertible hedge desks of investment banks. In order
to induce these new investors to buy the convertible bonds from the original holders, the price of
the convertible bond must fall. Hence, this scenario will make it possible for the convertible hedge
desk to buy the bonds relatively cheaply.
4
By buying the bonds, the desks will now be exposed
to equity risk because the value of a convertible bond is positively correlated with the stock price.
This risk can be hedged by short selling the underlying stock.
5
Consistent with such an arbitrage
strategy, Howe, Lin, and Singh (1998) show that the price of convertible preferred stocks decrease
at the announcement of a call and that the trade in the convertible preferred stocks increases. In
addition, these authors provide some evidence that at the time of a call it is a protable strategy
to buy the called convertible preferred stock and hedge the associated risk by short selling the
underlying stock.
In addition to the convertible hedge desks, a possible underwriter of the call may also have an
incentive to sell short in the case of convertible bond calls. An underwriter guarantees that the
bonds called are converted into new stock in the rm and hence, the underwriter prevents the case
where the rm suddenly has so come up with cash in order to pay for the redemption of the bonds.
Normally, the underwriter will do this by paying in cash the call payment promised to those bond-
holders who do not convert and by buying the corresponding stock from the rm. This means that
the underwriter will buy the new shares and pay the call payment in situations where a conversion
3
There is a growing amount of literature related to these limits of arbitrage. Two recent examples are Wurgler
and Zhuravskaya (2000) and Xiong (2001). Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2000) argue that arbitrage will be risky
because stocks do not, in practice, have perfect substitutes. This will make risk averse arbitrageurs trade less
aggressively and hence, this `arbitrage risk' will prevent arbitrage from attening demand curves for stocks. Xiong
(2001) uses an equilibrium model to study speculators taking risky positions (or in our terminology seeking real
arbitrage opportunities). In this model Xiong shows that a capital loss from an unfavorable shock can make speculators
liquidate their positions resulting in amplication of the original shock. Surveys and further discussions of related
literature can be found in Shleifer (2000), Campbell (2000), and Hirshleifer (2001).
4
In a more general analysis of convertible bonds, Athanassakos and Carayannopoulos (2000) provide evidence that
convertible bonds are often underpriced in the sense that negative conversion option values are implied.
5
The investment strategy of buying convertible bonds and selling short the underlying stock is known as convertible
bond arbitrage.
3
is not optimal for the bondholders. This is the reason why underwriters too have incentives to
hedge by short selling the stock. The incentive of the hedge desks and the underwriter to hedge by
short selling stock is further described in section 3.
In order to provide evidence for such hedging this paper makes the rst study of short selling
around calls of convertible securities. More precisely, the study examines the relation between
short selling, the trade volume associated with a call, the predictability of the call, the stock price
reaction to the call announcement, and variables related to hedging.
The study shows that short selling of stock increases in anticipation of the call and that during
the conversion period, the number of shares sold short is more than three times higher than the
level after the call. On average, the total short selling involves at least 19% of the new shares to be
issued upon conversion. This corresponds to nearly 14 days of trading based on the average trade
volume before the call. Furthermore, the study provides evidence of a large increase in trade volume
at the announcement of the call, and this trade volume is related to the number of new shares to
be issued upon conversion of the bonds. Such an increase in trade volume is likely to depress stock
prices, thus causing the short-run price pressure around the convertible bond call. In addition, the
study documents in several ways that short selling is not only caused by a possible underwriter.
Finally, the study shows that the relation between the announcement eect and several variables
describing the call is consistent with a hedging induced price pressure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses related literature.
Section 3 describes calls of convertible bonds in four subsections. Firstly, the characteristics of a
called convertible bond; secondly, the use of underwriters; thirdly, the risk faced by the dierent
parties involved in the call; and nally, the short selling and hedging associated with convertible
bond calls. Section 4 briey describes the methodology and data-set used in this paper. Section
5 presents and discusses the empirical results in four parts. Firstly, an event study and a price-
rebound test document the negative announcement eect and the subsequent recovery of stock
prices. Secondly, a study of the price pressure explanation is performed. Thirdly, short selling is
examined in detail, including a study of how short selling relates to the called convertible bond.
Finally, the announcement eect is linked to hedging and the use of underwriters. Section 6 gives
implications of the results and suggests further research. A short summary and concluding re-
marks are given in section 7. Appendix A examines how the hedging of equity risk associated with
convertible bonds will be aected by a call. Appendix B describes the event study method.
4
2 Related literature
A negative announcement eect was rst documented by Mikkelson (1981). Mikkelson found an
announcement eect only for convertible bonds and not for convertible preferred stocks and used a
tax argument to explain his ndings.
6
Later, several studies showed that the announcement eect
also exists for convertible preferred stocks, eliminating the validity of the tax argument. Harris and
Raviv (1985) provided a theoretical model that explained why the call might be taken as a signal
revealing bad news about the rm's prospects. The basic idea is that if the management of a rm
expect dividends to increase in the future, there is no reason to call the bond because bondholders
will convert voluntarily. This way a call will reveal to the stock market that the management
do not expect dividends to increase in the future. Ofer and Natarajan (1987) claimed to nd
empirical evidence for this bad-news explanation. For the calling rms, they found a negative
cumulative abnormal return for the period following the announcement. However, several papers
(Cowan, Nayar, and Singh (1990) and Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991)) subsequently
showed that the empirical evidence does not seem to support the signaling model as argued in Ofer
and Natarajan (1987). Furthermore, Byrd (1992), Byrd and Moore (1996), and Ederington and
Goh (2001) showed that no evidence for the bad-news explanation can be found by investigating
how nancial analysts react to the call announcement. In addition, Ederington and Goh (2001)
documented that insiders purchase more stock than normal in the rm around the time of the call
which also contradicts the bad-news explanation.
In contrast to Ofer and Natarajan (1987), Mazzeo and Moore (1992) documented a recovery
of stock prices during the conversion period. Based on this and other tests, Mazzeo and Moore
argued that the announcement eect is due to a price pressure caused by investors wanting to sell
the new stock received upon conversion of the bonds. However, a problem with the arguments in
Mazzeo and Moore (1992) is that { as it follows from section 3 in this paper { bondholders will
not convert at the time of the call announcement, and hence the new shares will not be issued
until later. In addition, the bondholders will not in general hold any of the underlying stock at the
time of the call. Therefore, Mazzeo and Moore (1992) do not provide an explanation as to how
the later increase in the supply of shares actually translate into price pressure at the time of the
announcement.
Several studies have documented that changes in the supply of stock may lead to price eects.
6
Interest payments on convertible bonds are tax deductible while this is not the case for dividends paid on
convertible preferred stocks.
5
These price eects can be either short term eects due to a lack of liquidity in the stock market
or long-term eects due to downward-sloping demand curves. Some of these studies include Kraus
and Stoll (1972), Mikkelson and Partch (1985), Harris and Gurel (1986), and Shleifer (1986).
Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) showed that whether the call is underwritten or not seems
to be relevant for the size of the announcement eect. They found that the announcement eect
is signicant for underwritten calls only and argued that this is due to the fact that underwriters
are primarily used by rms with the most unfavorable information or because of an agency conict
in the calling rm. The use of underwriters would for example indicate an agency conict if
managers and underwriters collude at the expense of the shareholders (Smith (1977)) or if risk
averse managers employ underwriters for a personal risk reduction (Amihud and Lev (1981)).
Underwritten calls of convertible bonds have some similarities with underwritten rights oers.
Both types of underwriting deals can be seen as a commitment by an investment bank to buy
new shares from a rm in the case where a stock price decline makes the right/conversion right
out-of-the-money. Singh (1997) examined underwritten rights oers and found that in the rights
oering period, underwriters purchase rights hedged with the short sale of the common stock. On
average the underwriters acquire 15.80% of the shares oered through purchase and exercise of
rights and short sell a corresponding number of shares. Consistent with many of the arguments
presented in this paper Singh explained the behavior of the underwriters by an incentive to reduce
their exposure to the standby underwriting. In addition, Singh documented that rights oers are
associated with negative abnormal returns around the announcement followed by positive abnormal
returns after the expiration of the right. Finally, there is a negative correlation between the size of
the announcement eect and the number of shares sold short by underwriters.
A nal important paper, which should be mentioned, is Jaee and Shleifer (1990). They
considered the delay of convertible bond calls and the use of underwriters.
7
As it will follow from
section 3.3, their arguments for the delay and the use of underwriters are related to the explanation
of the announcement eect given in the present paper. According to Jaee and Shleifer (1990),
rms will have a high risk exposure when calling a convertible bond issue. This risk is argued to
explain the calling rms' behavior. Krishnan and Rao (1996) provided empirical evidence for the
arguments in Jaee and Shleifer (1990). Jaee and Shleifer (1990) will be described in further
detail in section 3.3.
7
By the delay of convertible bond calls is referred to the ndings that rms seem to call later than dictated by
the optimal call policy. Footnote 18 describes this in further detail.
6
3 Convertible bonds
The basic characteristics of convertible bonds are described in nearly all standard nance text-
books, but it is diÆcult to nd a satisfactory description of convertible bonds in the case of a call.
Therefore, this section will focus on called convertible bonds. Firstly, the necessary terminology
is introduced and the valuation of the dierent parts of a called convertible is considered. Sec-
ondly, underwriters of convertible bond calls and the risk associated with the calls are described.
Finally, this leads to a description of how holders of convertible bonds are expected to react to a
call announcement.
8
3.1 Calls of convertible bonds
Convertible bonds are used by rms to raise capital and can be viewed as a hybrid security having
characteristics of both ordinary bonds and common stock. The reason is that convertible bonds on
one hand are interest paying and have a promised payment at maturity, just like ordinary bonds.
On the other hand, convertible bonds have a stock component because the holder of convertible
bonds has an option to exchange the bonds for new common stock in the rm.
9
The option to
convert is an American style option that matures at the same time as the bond. The terms under
which the bond can be exchanged for stock are normally stated in the form of either a conversion
ratio or a conversion price. The conversion ratio denotes the number of shares that will be received
per face value of the bond, while the conversion price denotes the price in $ face value that will
be paid per share received upon a conversion. Both terms are given in the bond indenture and are
of course adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. The relation between the two terms for a
bond with face value $1000 is given as
Conversion ratio =
$1000
Conversion price
:
In addition to the conversion option, the majority of convertible bonds also gives the issuing
rm a call option, making it possible to redeem the bonds prematurely.
10
The rm redeems the
bonds by mailing a notice of redemption (the call announcement) to each bondholder in which
8
The information in sections 3.3 and 3.4 is based on information from several conversations and interviews with
dierent convertible hedge desks and convertible bond managers. In this connection, the author owes special thanks
to convertible bond investors at Salomon Brothers, Smith Barney, County NatWest, and Credit Suisse First Boston.
9
In some cases, a convertible bond is convertible into another rm's stock. In this case, the convertible bond is
more precisely called an exchangeable bond.
10
However, many convertible bonds are non-callable for a period, typically the rst three years after they are issued
or until stock prices have reached a certain level.
7
the rm oers to buy each bond for the so-called call payment. The call payment, also known
as the eective call price, is the sum of the interest accrued since the last interest payment and a
term calculated on the basis of a pre-specied value denoted the call price. The call price states
the percentage of the face value that has to be oered to bondholders in addition to the accrued
interest and is normally a number higher than 100% decreasing over time towards 100%. Even if
the bond is called, it will still be possible for bondholders to convert into stock. The announce-
ment of the call starts the conversion period (or notice period) in which each bondholder has to
decide whether to convert into stock or accept the call payment. The length of the conversion
period varies but on average it is around 30 calender days. The notice of redemption will state the
last date where conversion is possible and the call date (redemption date), where the unconverted
bonds will be redeemed and the corresponding call payments made. The call date is often the
same date as the last conversion date but it can also be a later date. Figure 1 shows the dier-
ent dates for a convertible bond call and gives the range in trading days between the dierent dates.
-
Announcement-
date
Last
conversion
date
| {z }
8{60 days
Call
date
| {z }
0{11 days
Figure 1: Time-line for calls of convertible bonds. The call date is also known as the redemption date. The
number of days between the dierent days have been taken from the sample of calls of convertible bonds
described in section 4.2 and are stated in trading days.
All calls considered in this paper are what is known as conversion forcing (or in-the-money)
calls. This means that the conversion value, i.e. the value of the shares that would be received upon
a conversion, is higher than the call payment at the time of the call.
11
Therefore, if a bondholder
had to choose whether to convert or not at the day of the announcement, it would be optimal to
convert into stock. A conversion forcing call is said to fail if the bondholders in the end choose
not to convert into stock. Forced conversion is dierent from voluntary conversion, where the later
is a conversion that occurs before the bond is called. The following will consider the value of a
convertible bond in the case of a conversion forcing call.
11
More precisely, the conversion value at a certain point in time is the current stock price times the conversion
ratio, i.e. the value in $ of the stock that will be received from an immediate conversion.
8
If we assume that there are no dividend or interest payments in the conversion period, we
can, at the time of a call, consider a convertible bond in two dierent ways. First, to own the
convertible bond is the same as owning the stock into which the bond is convertible plus a put
option allowing the bondholder to put the stock to the rm at the end of the conversion period for
the call payment. Second, to own the convertible bond also corresponds to have the present value
of the call payment plus a call option with a exercise price equal to the call payment, making it
possible for the bondholder to receive the stock into which the bond is convertible.
We will now examine these options and their values. Let us assume that we have one convertible
bond with conversion ratio n, meaning that it is convertible into n new shares. CP denotes the call
payment and  denotes the length of the conversion period. Finally, we will let S
t
be the price of
one share at time t and assume that the announcement of the call happens at time t = 0.
12
From
the above it follows that at the time of the call announcement, the value of the convertible bond
D
C
0
is given as
D
C
0
(S
0
) = nS
0
+ p(nS
0
; ; CP ) (1)
= PV
0
(CP ) +C(nS
0
; ; CP ): (2)
PV
0
(CP ) is the present value at time 0 of the call payment, p(nS; ; CP ) is the value of a European
put option on n shares, each worth S, where the put option has time  to maturity and the exercise
price CP . C(nS; ; CP ) is the value of the corresponding American call option. Contrary to the put
option, the call option will be an American style option because the holder of the convertible bond
can choose to convert at any time during the conversion period. In the case of an early exercise of
the call option, it is worth noting that the exercise price at time t <  is PV
t
(CP ) because the call
payment, CP , will only be received at time  . In the absence of dividends, it is straightforward
to show that this American call option will not be exercised before maturity.
13
Therefore, we can
see that the two dierent ways to look at a called convertible bond correspond to the well-known
put-call parity.
In the following, we will focus on the value of the put option. In order to present some numbers
on the value of the put option, we will now assume a standard Black and Scholes (1973) set-up.
12
Actually, S
t
should be the \diluted" share price, i.e. the value of a share taking into account the number of new
shares that will be issued upon conversion of the bonds. However, if the bond is called, it is reasonable to assume
that the dierence between the diluted and undiluted share price is small. Therefore, in order to simplify notation,
we will just let S
t
denote the share price.
13
From a standard arbitrage argument it follows that for the value c
t
of the corresponding European call option at
time t, we must have c
t
 max[0; S
t
  PV
t
(CP )]. But the right hand side is the value obtained from a conversion of
the American call option at time t, which gives that the value of the American call option is equal to the corresponding
European call option, and thus there will be no early exercise.
9
As usual, this is a convenient but questionable assumption and the next section will describe why
especially in the case of convertible bond calls, this assumption might be inappropriate. According
to the Black-Scholes set-up, we assume that the stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion
with a constant volatility . The value of the put option in (1) is then given by the well-known
Black-Scholes formula for a put option. In obtaining numerical values, we assume the following
parameters, which according to the data-set seem realistic:
 = 1=12 r = 4%:
By using the Black-Scholes formula, we can calculate the value of the put option relative to
the value nS
0
, which would be received by an immediate conversion. This relative value of the
put option is presented in Table I for dierent values of the volatility, , and the moneyness of the
conversion right.
14
The moneyness of the conversion right is denoted in % and is dened as
nS
0
CP
 1,
meaning that if the value received by an immediate conversion is equal to the call payment, the
moneyness would be 0%.
Relative value of the put option
Moneyness  = 0:15  = 0:40  = 0:90
0% 1.664% 4.432% 10.871%
10% 0.026% 1.198% 6.496%
20% 0.000% 0.240% 3.808%
30% 0.000% 0.037% 2.199%
40% 0.000% 0.005% 1.255%
Table I: The value of the put option, p, in (1) relative to the conversion value, nS
0
, as a function of the
moneyness of the conversion right and the volatility of stock prices, . The three values of  are selected
close to the minimum, the mean, and the maximum of  for the stocks in the data-set, where  is estimated
within the conversion period. The moneyness is dened as
nS
0
CP
  1, where CP is the call payment.
From Table I, we observe that if the convertible bond is called when the conversion right is
at-the-money, the put option will be worth more than 4.4% of the conversion value for the stock
with an average volatility. As expected, the value of the put option is decreasing in the moneyness
of the conversion right. However, for a bond convertible into one of the more volatile stocks, the
14
The value of the put option relative to the conversion value will only be a function of the moneyness,  , , and
r, and therefore, the exact values of CP , n, and S
0
are not specied.
10
put option will have a high value even if the conversion right is deep in-the-money. In general,
the put option can indeed be a value attached to a called convertible bond, which it would be
suboptimal for the bondholders to throw away by converting immediately after the announcement
of the call. Section 3.3 will discuss the value of the put option in further details and explain why to
the calling rm and to certain investors the put option may have a value higher than the calculated
Black-Scholes value.
If we have a dividend or interest payment within the conversion period, the valuation of the
convertible bond becomes more complicated than described above. If for example there is a dividend
payment in the conversion period, the formulation in (1) will no longer be valid. This is because
the holder of the convertible bond will only be entitled to the dividend payment if the bondholder
gives up the put option and converts the bond before the dividend payment.
15
However, from the
formulation in (2) and the theory on American call options, it follows that the bondholder will only
nd it optimal to convert either just prior to a dividend payment or at the end of the conversion
period. This result will not change if we also have an interest payment in the conversion period
because this might only increase the incentive to delay conversion.
The results above allow us to make the important conclusion that an eventual conversion is
expected to happen either just prior to a dividend payment or at the end of the conversion period.
However, if there is a risk or costs associated with being long in the convertible bond during the
conversion period, for example because of a costly hedge against the risk, it may be optimal to
convert earlier. Because the put option has the highest value when the conversion right is just
in-the-money, we should expect that the delay in conversion is most pronounced for the calls that
are just in-the-money. These results will be important later in section 5.3 when the short selling
around a convertible bond call is examined. We will return to the risk and the related hedging
after we have described the use of underwriters.
3.2 The underwriter
In some cases, the calling rm chooses to use an underwriter.
16
The underwriter guarantees that
all bonds are converted into new stock in the rm. Normally, the underwriter will do this by paying
15
In the case of a dividend payment within the conversion period, the stock price, S
0
, in (1) should be cum
dividends, S
cum
0
, and the put option should be replaced by a call option on a put option. This call option would have
an exercise value equal to the dividends of the shares that would be received upon conversion, and the stock price in
the put option should be ex dividends, i.e. S
ex
t
. Hence, with a dividend payment of div per share at time
^
t <  , (1)
should instead read D
C
0
(S
0
) = nS
cum
0
+ PV
0
(max[0; p(nS
ex
^
t
;   
^
t; CP )  n  div]).
16
In the sample of calls in this paper, slightly more than 30% are underwritten.
11
an amount greater than or equal to the call payment to the bondholders who do not convert and by
taking the corresponding stock from the rm.
17
Thereby, the underwriter ensures that the rm will
get all bonds converted into new stock instead of suddenly having to come up with cash in order
to pay the call payment. The underwriter is paid an underwriting fee for providing this insurance
to the rm. The underwriting fee will normally be a payment up front (the standby fee) and an
additional payment (a take-up fee) for each bond converted into stock by the underwriter.
The underwriting fees are quite substantial. Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) found that the
standby fee alone on average corresponds to 1.05% of the face amount of the issue outstanding. If
the take-up fee is included, the total underwriting fee is on average 4.19% of the face amount of
issue outstanding.
The fact that the underwriter guarantees the conversion of all the bonds means that the un-
derwriter will receive the new shares and pay the call payment in situations where the conversion
right ends out-of-the-money. Therefore, the underwriter has actually sold the rm a put option for
each outstanding convertible bond. This put option corresponds exactly to the put option in (1).
In this way, the calling rm will no longer be exposed to the risk associated with being short these
put options. The calling rm pays the underwriter in order to avoid this risk. Consequently, the
cost to the calling rm of a failed conversion must be substantial since the rm is willing to pay
these high underwriting fees. The next subsection will try to describe the risk and costs associated
with a convertible bond call, both for the calling rm and the underwriter.
The underwriting fee should be a payment for the put options the underwriter sells to the rm.
According to Table I, among other things this implies that one should expect a negative relation
between the moneyness of the conversion right and the underwriting fee. Nayar, Cowan, and Singh
(1991) documented such a signicant negative relation for a sample of 38 underwritten calls. The
next section will provide evidence that the standby fees are much higher than expected according
to the Black-Scholes value of the put option and describe why this is the case.
3.3 Risk associated with convertible bond calls
The value of a called convertible bond and the attached put option in a Black-Scholes set-up was
considered above. However, the following will explain why the Black-Scholes set-up probably is
inappropriate in this case.
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First Financial Management Corporation (FFMC) is one example of a rm that applied an underwriter in
a convertible bond call. On September 9, 1991, FFMC announced that it was calling for redemption all of its
outstanding 7% convertible bonds. The call was underwritten by The First Boston Corp., who oered to redeem
bonds at a purchase price of $1066.33. This purchase price was higher than the call payment of $1065.33.
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One immediate explanation might be the magnitude of the calls. Table III in section 4.2 gives
summary statistics for the data-set and shows that the calls on average involve more than 12%
of the rm's stock, making it diÆcult to perform the standard Black-Scholes replication of the
put options. However, there are more interesting and informative explanations as to why parties
involved in a convertible bond call may value the put option higher than the Black-Scholes value.
Here, two important factors are risk and risk aversion. The calling rm faces the risk of a
failed conversion. The forced conversion fails if a stock price decline in the conversion period makes
the option to convert out-of-the-money at the end of the conversion period. In this case, the
bondholders will choose not to convert and the rm is forced to raise cash on short notice in order
to pay o bondholders. Given the magnitude of the calls, this sudden need for funds can create
costs of nancial distress for the rm. These costs will especially be substantial after the stock
price decline that caused the conversion to fail. Jaee and Shleifer (1990) argued that the costs
of a failed conversion can be substantial and that these costs explain why rms choose to use an
underwriter or delay the calls.
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However, the same arguments also explain why the value of the
put option is higher to the calling rm than the Black-Scholes value: If the conversion fails, it is
exactly the put options that will be exercised against the rm and require that it raises capital on
short notice.
If the rm uses an underwriter to guarantee the conversion, the risk of a failed conversion
will be taken by the underwriter as described earlier. The underwriter will be short put options
corresponding to those held by the bondholders and for this the underwriter is paid an underwriting
fee. According to Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991), the standby fee alone is on average 0.79% of the
conversion value. In addition, Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) found that on average the conversion
value for underwritten calls is 34% above the call payment. If these numbers are compared with
the numbers in Table I, it seems that just in standby fee the underwriter for an average rm
charges a price for the put option at least twenty times higher than expected according to the
Black-Scholes value. Unless there is a collusion between the potential underwriters, this indicates
that the underwriters also have risk preferences that make them value the put option higher than
18
Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977) both showed that the optimal call policy for the rm is to
force conversion immediately when the conversion right comes in-the-money. Inconsistent with this, Ingersoll (1977b)
found that the median rm delays the call until the conversion value is 43.9% higher than the call payment. Similarly,
Constantinides and Grundy (1987) also found evidence for call delays. However, Asquith (1995) documented that
the moneyness of the conversion right of called convertible bonds is not an appropriate measure of call delays because
of factors such as call protection or a cash ow advantage of the convertible bonds. Still, after adjusting for these
factors, Asquith found that the conversion value on average is 25.8% above the call payments. The 25.8% is in
accordance with what Jaee and Shleifer (1990) argued to be the `safety premium' required by the calling rms in
order to avoid a failed conversion.
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the Black-Scholes value. This is surprising because investment banks are expected to behave as if
they have a `portfolio' of underwriting deals and just hedge against the market risk. If this was
the case, the Black-Scholes value would be the correct value of the put option to underwriters.
However, this is clearly not the case. On the contrary, the investment banks behave as if they
evaluate each underwriting deal individually. With such an evaluation structure, it is clear why
the individual employee fears the case where the put options are in-the-money at the end of the
conversion period and therefore exercised against the underwriter. In these cases, the underwriter
will lose money and the employee may be held responsible. This explains why the put option also
will be valued higher than the Black-Scholes value by the underwriter.
That the risk of a failed conversion is non-trivial and taken seriously can be seen from the
following two examples from the data-set.
19
First, in 1973 Echlin called a convertible bond where
the conversion value at the announcement day was around 40% higher than the call payment.
However, because of the OPEC oil price incline, the conversion value dropped below the call price
during the conversion period. The call was underwritten by Kidder Peabody, who according to
Jaee and Shleifer (1990) lost more than $5 million on the deal. Second, on November 21, 1980,
Digital Equipment announced that they were planning to call a $400 million convertible debt issue.
Later (on December 4, 1980), Digital Equipment announced that they had been forced to withdraw
the plans because of a decline in stock prices in the period after the announcement of the plans.
This convertible bond issue was nally called on January 6, 1981, when according to the rm, the
conversion right was again suÆciently deep in-the-money. This call ended up being underwritten
by Lehman Brothers.
Finally, the risk also seems to be relevant for investors who hold the convertible bonds at the
time of the call or buys them shortly after. These investors will typically not be the same as
the investors (like convertible bond funds) who originally bought the convertible bonds. This is
because the original holders react to anticipated and realized calls by selling their convertibles
to arbitrageurs such as the convertible hedge desks of investment banks. At least three factors
may cause this selling behavior. Firstly, there are strict limits to the amount of equity risk these
convertible bond funds are allowed to take. Secondly, it may simply be that a call removes the
characteristics of the convertible bond, such as a conversion right with long time to maturity, that
19
There is also an interesting example from the calls of exchangeable bonds. In 1987 IBM made a conversion forcing
call of a Eurobond exchangeable into Intel stock owned by IBM. However, because of the 1987 crash, the conversion
failed. According to Barron's (December 14, 1987), IBM lost more than $12 million because the rm suddenly had
to pay cash to the bondholders instead of Intel stock.
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made the funds buy the bonds in the rst place. Hence, an anticipated or realized call will often
make the bonds unattractive to these funds. Finally, the original holders may not want or are not
allowed to hold the stock after the call and therefore see no reason to deal with the practical matters
related to the conversion itself. Furthermore, it is important to note that the conversion right will
generally make it optimal to sell the bonds in the market rather than converting the bond and selling
the shares received upon conversion. It is not the purpose of this paper to explain the behavior of
the original bondholders, but the managers of convertible bond funds and convertible hedge desks
that we talked to assured us that the original holders are selling the bonds in anticipation of or at
realized calls.
20
By buying the bonds, the convertible hedge desks of investment banks will now be exposed to
equity risk because the value of a convertible bond will be sensitive to changes in the stock price.
Based on our conversations and interviews (see footnote 8), we nd that just like underwriters, the
arbitrageurs (convertible hedge desks) evaluate the convertible bond investments on a deal-by-deal
basis. Such an evaluation scheme and risk aversion in the convertible hedge desks of course have
the consequence that the dealer in each convertible bond trade will have an incentive to hedge out
not only the market risk but also the rm specic risk of the convertible bond.
3.4 Short selling and hedging
The section above leads to a description of how we should expect dierent types of investors to
react to anticipated and realized calls of convertibles.
As mentioned, the original holders of convertibles will react to anticipated and realized calls by
selling their convertibles to the convertible hedge desks of investment banks. In turn, these desks
hedge against their equity exposure by shorting stock. Therefore, the number of shares sold short
is expected to increase in the period before the call announcement as the convertible hedge desks
buy additional bonds. The same eect is expected to lead to an increase in the short selling around
the time of the call as the hedge desks buy additional bonds from the original holders. However,
at the time of the call there will be an additional eect; the hedge ratio for the convertible bonds
already held by the desks will increase. This is illustrated in appendix A. The appendix shows that
unless the call is completely expected by the market, there will be an increase in the convertible's
sensitivity to changes in the rm value. When the convertible hedge desk hedges against this risk,
20
According to several convertible bond managers that we have talked to the fraction of newly issued shares owned
by the original bondholders after the conversion is less than 20%.
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there will be a similar increase in the number of shares sold short for hedging purposes.
As described in section 3.1, the bonds will not be converted immediately after the call an-
nouncement. Therefore, we should expect that the number of shares sold short stays at a high
level during the conversion period. Only later in the conversion period when the hedge desks nd
it optimal, do they convert the bonds and use the shares received to close out their short positions.
However, factors such as dividend payments during the conversion period and costs associated with
the maintaining of a hedging position can make it optimal to convert early as described in section
3.1. Consequently, these factors can lead to a high conversion rate early in the conversion period,
which will inuence the short selling pattern.
As seen in section 3.3, underwriters will also have an incentive to hedge the risk they are ex-
posed to. As for convertible hedge desks, this can be done by shorting stock.
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This means that we
should also expect to see underwriters of convertible bond calls shorting stock. The underwriters
who are short the put option can, in contrast to the convertible hedge desks, have an incentive
to eliminate the put options as soon as possible by buying up bonds and converting them. Such
an incentive will exist if the underwriter wants to eliminate the risk exposure as soon as possible,
and a positive take-up fee will make this incentive even stronger. This incentive gives an explana-
tion for the observation that in order to get the bonds as early as possible, the underwriters are
sometimes willing to redeem the bonds for a payment above the call payment.
22
In addition, this
also explains the general perception in the convertible bond market that underwriters are active
in the convertible bond market buying up bonds at prices above what other market participants
(arbitrageurs) are willing to pay. By converting the bonds, the underwriters then can eliminate
their short position in the put options and close out their short positions in the stock at the same
time as they receive the take-up fee. Singh (1997) showed that underwriters are buying rights in
the market and are short selling stock in the case of underwritten rights oers and explains this by
arguments similar to those above.
Such a behavior by the underwriter of convertible bond calls is recognized by the stock market
as it can be seen from an article in the Investment Dealers' Digest. On April 29, 1996, the magazine
described a call by AMR Corp. of a $1 billion convertible bond issue. The call was underwritten
by ve investment banks.
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As underwriters, these investment banks had agreed to buy up to 12.9
21
When the underwriter short sells to hedge the risk associated with his short position in the put options, this is
an example of what is known as `to lay o'.
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This is for example the case for the call described in footnote 17, where the underwriter oers a purchase price
higher than the call payment.
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CS First Boston, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Salomon Brothers and Goldman, Sachs & Co.
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million shares if the investors did not convert eliminating any need for AMR Corp. to come up with
cash should conversion fail. This call is argued to have a high risk prole not only because of the
magnitude of the call but also because the conversion value is just 12.7% above the call payment.
As mentioned in the article: \It's one of those deals where the rm's relationship guys are happy,
but the risk management side is not happy." The announcement of the call led to a stock price
decline of 6:0% increasing the risk of a failed conversion. However, as noted in the article: \...
the underwriters themselves were causing some of the pressure on the stock, as they aggressively
reduced their risk by buying bonds and shorting the stock in the open market. According to one
source, only $400 million of the risk remained two days after the call announcement." The open
market operations both reduced the underwriters' risks and allowed them to get the take-up fee,
which in this call was 1.25% for the rst $200 million, 1.5 % for the next $200 million, and so on.
Based on these arguments, we should expect that the number of shares sold short and hence
also the number of shares traded (the trade volume) are related to the call. The number of shares
sold short is expected to increase in the period prior to the call with a peak at the announcement
of the call. In addition, the number of shares sold short is expected to decline at the end of the
conversion period, when the new shares received upon conversion of the bonds are used to close
out the short positions. However, the decline in the number of shares sold short may occur before
the end of the conversion period if for example an underwriter is converting the bonds as soon as
possible. An increase in the short selling of stock is also expected to be seen as an increase in the
number of shares traded around the call announcement. The trade volume and the short selling of
stock will be examined in sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Such an increase in the short selling of stock will help to explain how new shares issued upon
a later conversion can lead to a price pressure at the announcement of the call. Part of the an-
nouncement eect may therefore be caused by investors who { for hedging purposes { short stock
as described above. The subsequent price recovery will then follow as the hedging positions are
closed out. The short selling leads to price pressure because the price has to fall in order to induce
investors to absorb the increased supply of shares. Short selling is often argued to indicate a future
excess demand for the stock because the short sellers later have to buy shares in the stock market
in order to close out their short positions. However, this will not be the case when shares are sold
short to hedge a convertible bond call. In this case the short selling represents a future increase
in the supply. Section 5.4 examines the relation between the announcement eect and the short
selling of stock.
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The sections above have argued that short selling is important in connection with convertible
bond calls. Therefore, the following will briey describe how the regulations of short selling take
this into account. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule x240.3b-3 denes a `short
sale' as: The term short sale means any sale of a security which the seller does not own : : : . A
holder of a convertible bond will be deemed to own the corresponding shares only when the convert-
ible bond has been handed in for conversion. This means that if a convertible bondholder without
owning the corresponding shares sells some of these before the bond is handed in for conversion,
this will be dened as a short sale.
Short sales are regulated in the SEC Rule xx240.10a-1 and 240.10a-2. From x240.10a-1(a) it
follows that short sales are prohibited when stock prices are declining according to the so-called up-
tick rule. More precisely, the up-tick rule states that short sales are only permitted at a price higher
than the preceding transaction in the same stock (an up-tick) or at the same price as the previous
transaction but at a higher price than the last dierence price (a zero-plus-tick). However, there
are important exemptions from this rule. x240.10a-1(e) states that the up-tick rule does not apply
(i.e. you can short stock exempt from the up-tick rule) if you either are the owner of a convertible
bond or if you are making a lay-o sale in connection with a standby underwriting commitment.
This means that even if stock prices are declining, it will be possible for both arbitrageurs who own
convertible bonds and for the underwriter to short sell the corresponding stock. The exemption
from the up-tick rule is clearly important in the case of convertible bond calls because the call
announcement is associated with declining stock prices.
4 Methodology and data-set
4.1 The methodology
A standard event study is used to derive the pattern of abnormal stock returns in a period around
the call announcement. The event study and the related tests are briey described in appendix
B. An estimation period from 150 to 300 days after the announcement is used in order to avoid
the selection bias caused by using a pre-event estimation period.
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This period is used to estimate
the normal return parameters according to the market model with the equally weighted index from
24
Because convertible bonds are typically issued with a conversion right deep out-of-the-money, the stock prices
should incline before it will be possible for the rm to force conversion by calling the bond. Hence, the use of a
pre-event estimation period will bias the so-called normal returns used in the event study (Cowan, Nayar, and Singh
(1990), and Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991)) and therefore, a post-event estimation window should be
used.
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CRSP as market index. The event study has also been performed using other methods to calculate
the excess returns, with other estimation periods, with the constant return model and with the
value weighted index as market index. All these changes give results similar to those in the next
section as long as the estimation period is after the event.
This paper also uses some other tests which will be dened and described when used.
4.2 The data-set of convertible bond calls
The data-set consists of calls of convertible bonds in the period 1963-1995. Standard and Poor's
Bond Guide and Moody's Bond Guide have been used to identify the calls.
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From this set of calls,
we select those fullling the following selection criteria:
 An announcement date can be identied in either the Wall Street Journal or through Lexis-
Nexis/Dow Jones News Wires.
 The rm's stock is registered on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) implying that stock information is available on the CRSP-le.
 The conversion value at the time of the announcement is higher than the call payment.
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This leads to a sample of 380 calls distributed over time as illustrated in Table II. The table shows
that even though there are fewer observations in the beginning of the time period, there is no severe
clustering of observations. In addition, because we are interested in how the call aects the stock
prices, we have to ensure that a possible eect is not due to other news announced around the call.
Finally, in order to apply the event study, stock returns have to exist for a period around the call
announcement and in the estimation period. Therefore, when in the rest of this paper we use an
event study or results from the event study, we will furthermore require that:
 No other news about the same rm appears in the Wall Street Journal in a two-day period
around the announcement date.
 Daily stock returns are available on the CRSP le from 50 days before the call to 300 days
after the call.
This reduces the sample to 309 calls, but it is still the largest sample of calls of convertible bonds
examined in the literature. The large data-set has been obtained because in contrast to most other
25
An initial set of calls was kindly provided by W. T. Moore.
26
The conversion value is calculated as the stock price two days prior to the announcement times the conversion
ratio.
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studies, the calls were not restricted to have been announced in the Wall Street Journal. In addi-
tion to the advantage of a larger data-set, the search in the news wires makes it possible to obtain
more accurate announcement dates. It happens that the news about the call is available on the
news wires a few days before it is printed in the Wall Street Journal. Because we are examining
the announcement eect, it is clearly important that we use the rst date where the stock market
receives information about the call as announcement date.
Period 63-65 66-68 69-71 72-74 75-77 78-80 81-83 84-86 87-89 90-92 93-95
Calls 5 24 23 24 23 46 32 48 60 41 54
Table II: Distribution through time of the sample of 380 convertible bond calls.
In addition to the announcement date, more detailed information about each individual con-
vertible bond issue is needed. Several sources have been used to collect this information. Some
of these are Standard & Poor's Bond Guide, Moody's Bond Guide, Moody's Industrials, the Wall
Street Journal, and the Corporate Financing Directory. All information on stock splits, number of
shares outstanding, stock prices, stock returns etc. was collected from the CRSP-le.
Summary statistics
Table III provides sample characteristics. From the table, we observe that convertible bond calls
in general lead to a quite signicant increase in the number of shares outstanding with an average
increase of 12.3% and a median of 9.6%. However, the increase in the number of shares outstanding
varies from 0.03% to 49.60%. The table also shows that the conversion value varies from 1% to
406% above the call payment with an average of 47%. These numbers indicate the existence of
so-called clean-up calls in the sample. Clean-up calls are calls with the purpose of redeeming an
issue with only a small amount of face value outstanding. These calls will typically only lead to
a small increase in the number of shares outstanding and can have a conversion right deep in-the-
money. This is further illustrated by the fact that the minimum face value of a called issue is only
$147,000. For clean-up calls, it is often the case that bondholders optimally should have converted
voluntarily but for dierent reasons there may exist so-called sleeping investors. In order to avoid
having to service such a little amount of debt outstanding, the rm can redeem the debt by calling
it. Constantinides and Grundy (1987) and Dunn and Eades (1989) both examined these `sleeping
investors' in further detail.
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The length of the conversion period is on average slightly longer than one calendar month, cor-
responding to 23.5 trading days. The bonds are observed to be called many years before maturity,
on average more than 16 years. Finally, it should be noted that 115 of the 380 calls are underwritten
corresponding to slightly more than 30%. All in all the characteristics for the present data-set are
similar to characteristics reported for data-sets used in other studies of convertible bond calls.
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Increase in number of shares (millions) 2.23 1.27 0.01 20.80
Increase in number of shares (%) 12.32 9.61 0.03 49.60
Size of called issue ($ millions) 53.53 30.00 0.15 805.00
Conversion value/call payment 1.47 1.32 1.01 5.06
Length of conversion period (trading days) 23.52 22.00 8.00 60.00
Years left to maturity 16.66 18.00 1.00 27.00
Table III: Descriptive statistics for the 380 convertible bond calls in the period 1963-1995. The increase
in the number of shares (millions) is dened as the number of new shares that will be issued upon a full
conversion of the bonds outstanding. The increase in number of shares (%) is obtained by dividing the
increase in number of shares (millions) with the number of shares outstanding before the call. The size of
a called issue is the face value of debt outstanding before the call. The conversion value/call payment gives
the moneyness of the conversion right (i.e. the extent to which the conversion right is in-the-money). The
conversion value is calculated based on the stock price two days prior to the announcement of the call. The
length of the conversion period is the number of trading days from the announcement of the call until the
end of the conversion period. The years left to maturity is the number of years from the time of the call
until maturity of the bond, had it not been called.
4.3 The short interest data
In order to examine the short selling associated with convertible bond calls, information about the
number of shares sold short, also called the short interest, is required.
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Unfortunately, the short
interest numbers are available only on a monthly basis. Because short interest numbers are only
available electronically regarding the last few years, the numbers for this study were collected from
Standard & Poor's Daily Stock Price Record for NYSE and AMEX. The Daily Stock Price Records
report the short interest numbers for each individual stock on the respective stock exchange. The
numbers are similar to those published monthly in the Wall Street Journal and represent the total
number of shares sold short on the last day of trade on or before the 15th of the month. For this
27
More precisely, the short interest at a given point in time is the number of shares in an individual rm that has
been borrowed for short sales but not repaid at that time.
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study it is important to know the exact date for which the short interest is computed. This is
required in order to know whether additional short selling caused by the call announcement would
be reected in a certain short interest number or not. Because of the settlement period, the exact
calculation date for the short interest will depend on the length of this period. For most of the
time period considered, the settlement period was ve trading days, but in June 1995 it changed
to three trading days. Therefore, the record day for a short sale will be either three or ve trading
days before the report day. For example if the report date (the 15th) in a standard month before
June 1995 is a trading day, the short interest will report the number of shares sold short and still
not closed out when the stock exchange closes on the 8th.
The exact calculation day is calculated for all the individual short interest numbers and the
time series of short interest numbers for the individual stock are dened such that SI
 1
is the last
short interest number before the announcement, whereas SI
0
is the short interest number, if any,
reported between the announcement day and the last day in the conversion period.
28
SI
+1
is the
rst short interest number after the last day in the conversion period.
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In addition to the complications related to the calculation date, the Daily Stock Price Records
are troublesome to work with when collecting the short interest numbers. When there are stock
splits or stock dividends, it is often the case that one manually has to recalculate several of the
numbers accordingly. In addition, it happens that simple errors have been made in either the
order of the months or the order of the short interest numbers. In all cases, the numbers have to
be compared across several books with overlapping time periods in order to ensure accuracy. All
the short interest numbers have been checked this way and some have furthermore been checked
through a comparison to the numbers reported in the Wall Street Journal.
Summary statistics for the short interest numbers are provided in section 5.3, where the short
interest numbers are examined.
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For six calls, there were actually more than one short interest number in the conversion period. For these calls,
the rst of these is used as SI
0
. One hundred calls did not have a short interest number reported in the conversion
period.
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An example from the data-set can illustrate the tedious work performed in order to get accurate time series of
short interest data. On February 10, 1986, Piedmont Aviation Inc. announced a call of a $50 million convertible bond
issue. February 15, 1986, is a Saturday, meaning that the settlement date for the February short interest number is
February 14. With a settlement period of ve days, the short interest number for February reports the number of
shares sold short at the close of the stock exchange on February 7 and will therefore not include the shares sold short
because of the call announcement. Hence, the short interest number from February will be SI
 1
. Similarly, it can
be shown that the short interest number for March will report the number of shares sold short on March 7. Because
this call has March 3 as last conversion date, this is an example where there is no short interest number reported
within the conversion period and the March number will be SI
+1
. If the last conversion date had been after March
7 but before April 8, the short interest from March would have been SI
0
and the April number would have been
SI
+1
. However, if this had been the case it should be noted that SI
0
would be from a date many days after the call
announcement date and thus SI
0
can be problematic in measuring the additional short selling at the announcement.
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5 Evidence for a short selling induced price pressure
This section examines the data-set of convertible bond calls and the data-set of short interest
numbers described in the previous section. Section 5.1 provides evidence for the announcement
eect and the subsequent recovery of stock prices using both an event study, a price-rebound
test, and a regression of the price recovery on the announcement eect. Section 5.2 considers
price pressure in further detail by examining the trade volume around the call announcement and
the relation between the announcement eect and the number of new shares to be issued upon
conversion. Section 5.3 examines the short interest numbers including the time pattern. Section
5.4 ends the empirical results by examining whether the announcement eect can be explained by
variables expected to be relevant according to the hedge arguments given in section 3.4.
5.1 The announcement eect and price recovery
In addition to documenting the announcement eect, the following provides evidence that stock
prices recover after the call announcement. However, it is not obvious during which time period
prices should be expected to recover if the stock price pattern is caused by price pressure. Here the
conversion period has been chosen because no additional short selling is expected after this period
and the short positions are expected to be closed out with new stock issued upon conversion of the
bonds. When examining if prices have recovered, there may still be problems associated with the
use of the last conversion date. Some stock prices may have recovered earlier whereas the recovery
may take even longer for other stocks. These dierences can be due to dierent lengths of the
conversion periods or because the depth of the market diers from stock to stock. Furthermore, for
calls where there has been no or only little short selling there might be additional price pressure
around the end of the conversion period from the new shares issued upon conversion. For these
bonds, the shares issued will not be used to close out short positions but will represent an increase
in the supply.
5.1.1 The event study
The results from the event study described in appendix B are shown in Table IV. For dierent event
time periods, the table shows the cumulative average abnormal return, (CAR), and two dierent
tests for CAR = 0 and their corresponding p-values. The test-statistic Z is the parametric test
dened in (B.10) in appendix B whereas J is the non-parametric sign-test dened in (B.12). The
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announcement period is from day  1 to day 0 to take into account that many of the announcements
occured one day before the news was published in the Wall Street Journal.
30
Period (event days) CAR(%) Z p-value(%) J p-value(%)
-50:-2 8.64 8.54 < 0:01 7.90 < 0:01
-1:0  1:75  10:86 < 0:01  8:93 < 0:01
+1:lcvd 2.24 2.99 0.28 3.13 0.18
lcvd+1:lcvd+50 2.03 1.76 7.77 1.31 19.07
-2:lcvd 0.49  0:29 77.24 0.40 69.05
Table IV: Results from the event study described in appendix B. Date 0 is the announcement date. lcvd
denotes the last day in the conversion period. CAR is the cumulative average abnormal return for the
dierent time periods and is dened in (B.9). Z is the corresponding test statistic for the signicance of
CAR dened in (B.10) and J is the sign-test for the signicance of CAR dened in (B.12). The p-values
are calculated based on the fact that both Z and J are asymptotic normally distributed.
These results from the event study can be illustrated graphically as in Figure 2, where the time-
pattern for the cumulative average abnormal return is shown. Table IV and Figure 2 both show
that as expected according to footnote 24, the stocks have high abnormal returns in the period
before the call. The call announcement leads to a highly signicant  1:75% abnormal return, but
the stock prices recover during the conversion period with an abnormal return of 2.24%, signicant
at the 1% level. All in all, this gives an insignicant abnormal return of 0.49% in the period from 2
days before the announcement to the end of the conversion period. Figure 2 and Table IV therefore
provide evidence for a signicant announcement eect and a price recovery of stock prices during
the conversion period. The following will examine this further.
5.1.2 The price-rebound test
Instead of examining stock returns, we can consider stock prices in order to examine if stock prices
recover during the conversion period. One way to test for a recovery is to compare the stock price
two days before the announcement with the stock price at the end of the conversion period as done
in Byrd and Moore (1996). Here we extend their test by comparing these stock prices with the
30
For calls announced only in the News Wires, the announcement day is the day after the call appears in the
News-wires in order to be consistent with the announcement dates from the Wall Street Journal. This also solves the
problem that these calls may be announced after the stock market has closed and an eventual eect will then only
appear the following day.
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Figure 2: The time pattern in the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) from the event study
described in appendix B. To estimate the normal returns, a standard market-model is used in a post-event
estimation window. Day 0 is the announcement day.
stock price one day after the call announcement, i.e. for each convertible bond in the sample we
calculate the following stock price ratios:
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P
 2
P
+1
P
lcvd
P
+1
P
lcvd
P
 2
;
where lcvd again denotes the last day in the conversion period, and  2 is two days before the
call announcement and +1 is the day after. As stock prices we use the PRC-variable from the
CRSP-le adjusted for stock splits in the conversion period. The results from comparing these
ratios to one are given in Table V.
Table V provides further evidence for a recovery of stock prices. As expected, both the median
and the mean are larger than one for all ratios and more than half of the sample recovers completely.
The rst two price ratios document a highly signicant price decline at the call announcement and
a highly signicant price incline during the conversion period. This price pattern is signicant both
in the mean and in a binomial test looking at the number of price ratios greater than one. All in
all, the total eect is a small price incline over the period from two days prior to the call to the
end of the conversion period. The t-statistics reveal that the mean of all three ratios is signicantly
higher than one at the 5% level.
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We calculate
P
 2
P
+1
instead of
P
+1
P
 2
such that all ratios are expected to be larger than one according to the existence
of an announcement eect and a subsequent price recovery.
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Ratio #greater than 1/#less than 1 Bin-prob Median Mean t-test for Mean 1
P
 2
P
+1
217/92 < 0:1% 1.0172 1.0171 7.62 (p < 0:1%)
P
lcvd
P
+1
184/125 < 0:1% 1.0168 1.0274 4.81 (p < 0:1%)
P
lcvd
P
 2
167/142 8.6% 1.0052 1.0113 1.89 (p = 3:0%)
Table V: Results from the price-rebound test. #greater than 1/#less than 1 refers to the number of the
dierent price ratios greater respectively less than one. Bin-prob is the probability of drawing at least the
observed number of price ratios greater than one under the binomial distribution with probability 0.5 and
309 trials. Median and Mean gives the median and the mean of the price ratios. The t-test is the one-sided
t-test for Mean 1 with p as the corresponding p-value.
5.1.3 Price recovery regression
Another way to look at the price recovery is to examine whether the stocks that have the largest
price decline also have the largest price recovery during the conversion period. To examine this,
we run the same regression as in Mazzeo and Moore (1992):
CAR
i;+1:lcvd
= + CAR
i; 1:0
+ 
i
:
According to a price recovery after the announcement eect, it should be expected that  in the
regression is negative. Using Weighted Least Squares,
32
this regression gives:
^ = 0:0075
^
 =  0:29
(t = 1:27) (t =  1:61)
(p = 20:6%) (p = 10:7%):
These results are not as strong as in Mazzeo and Moore (1992) but can still be taken as further
evidence for a price recovery.
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There may be several reasons why these results dier from the
results in Mazzeo and Moore (1992) and for why they are not stronger. For example, we use a
longer time period and an extended data-set including observations where the call announcement
is not published in the Wall Street Journal. In general, the emergence of new information about
the rm during the conversion period may also cause problems in the regression above. In the
event study, we have been strict in only using calls where no new information about the rm was
published around the call announcement. It is not possible to use the same selection criteria for
32
Because the conversion periods are of dierent lengths, we use 1 divided by 
i
p
L
cv;i
as weights, where 
i
is
the standard deviation of the daily stock returns for bond i in the estimation period, and L
cv;i
is the length of the
conversion period for bond i.
33
Similar results are obtained by a regression of
P
lcvd
P
+1
on a constant and
P
+1
P
 2
.
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observations with news in the conversion period because this would reduce the data-set to only
a few observations. Finally, there are two reasons why the -coeÆcient should not necessarily
be expected to be signicantly negative. First, as described earlier, it is not clear that the last
conversion date is the appropriate date to use when examining whether stock prices have recovered.
Second, there might be an additional price pressure during the conversion period as more bonds
are sold to the convertible hedge desks or as stock received upon conversion are sold in the stock
market.
To conclude we can say that the results from the event study and the tests above have shown
that stock prices recover during the conversion period, which indicate that the pattern in stock
prices is caused by price pressure. The next section examines this in further detail.
5.2 The trade volume and price pressure
Price pressure can be argued to have either a permanent or a temporary eect.
34
The eect is
permanent if an increase in supply according to a downward-sloped demand curve leads to a stock
price decline at the announcement and no recovery. On the other hand, the eect can be temporary
if there is insuÆcient liquidity in the stock market; the stock prices decline in order to induce the
stock market to absorb the new shares. In the case of convertibles, the new shares will not be
issued at the announcement of the call. As described in section 3.1, this is because a valuable put
option in general will make it optimal to delay conversion. Even if the new shares are not issued
at the announcement of the call, they can still aect the prices in the stock market at that time.
This will for example be the case if the holders of convertible bonds hedge against the increased
equity risk by short selling, as the increase in supply will then happen at the time of the call.
Because a short sale of shares will be registered as a trade, we should expect to see an increase
in the daily trade volume of the stock around the call announcement. This is examined in Figure 3.
The gure plots the average scaled daily trade volumes against the event-time. By scaled we mean
that before the average of the trade volumes is calculated, the trade volumes for the individual
stocks are divided by their average for the same period.
35
This is done in order to avoid that stocks
with a high daily trade volume become too inuential. If an identical number of shares was traded
each day, this would give the solid horizontal line at one shown in the gure. The dashed lines give
the one-standard deviation band around the mean. From Figure 3 it follows that there is a large
34
This is considered in for example Kraus and Stoll (1972), Shleifer (1986), and Harris and Gurel (1986).
35
Scaling by for example the number of shares outstanding gives a similar gure.
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increase in the number of shares traded around the day with the call announcement. There are also
indications of a higher trade volume in a short period after the announcement. This is consistent
with the argument that in a short period after the call announcement, there are investors who sell
the convertible bonds to the hedge desks, leading to additional short selling and an associated price
pressure. From Figure 2 it also follows that there is indications of additional price pressure the
rst few days after the call announcement.
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Figure 3: The pattern in average scaled daily trade volumes with day 0 as the announcement day. The
trade volumes for the individual stocks are divided by their mean for the same period. The horizontal line
at 1 shows the mean of the average scaled daily trade volumes and illustrates how the pattern would have
been if the same number of shares was traded every day. The dashed lines give the one-standard deviation
band around the mean.
In section 3.4 it was argued that the increase in the trade volume around the announcement
of the call is due to hedging performed by convertible hedge desks and a possible underwriter.
Therefore, we would expect a relation between the trade volume at the time of the call and the
number of new shares that would be issued upon a full conversion of the bonds. In order to have
the two measures at the same scale both measures are divided by the number of shares outstanding
before the call announcement. If hedging associated with the convertible bond calls is causing the
trade volume, a positive relation is expected between the trade volume and the number of shares
to be issued. The more new shares that will be issued upon conversion the more shares should be
36
The cumulative average abnormal return for day +1 to +3 is  0:16% and it is not until day +5 that stock prices
reaches a level higher than the level at day 0.
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sold in order to hedge the equity risk of the convertible bonds. The relation is examined by running
a regression of the total trade volume for day  1 and 0 (denoted TRV OL
i
) on a constant and the
number of new shares to be issued (denoted New
i
) where both numbers of shares are relative to
the total number of shares outstanding (denoted SO
i
). The number of new shares, New
i
, to be
issued upon a full conversion for call i, is calculated as the face value of the debt outstanding before
the call divided by the face value of one bond times the conversion ratio. With this notation, the
regression can be written as
TRV OL
i
SO
i
= 
0
+ 
1
New
i
SO
i
+ 
i
:
The results of the regression are:
^

0
= 0:0068
^

1
= 0:0511
(t = 5:9) (t = 6:61)
(p < 0:01%) (p < 0:01%)
Adj:R
2
= 0:12:
The regression results provide evidence for the expected positive relation. This means that a
higher fraction of new shares relative to the shares outstanding leads to additional trade volume.
This is consistent with the argument that the trade is caused by the hedging of the equity risk
associated with the convertible bond call.
So far this section has provided evidence for both a price recovery and the fact that the pat-
tern in stock prices may be due to price pressure caused by the call. However, we still need to
examine whether the increase in trade volume can be partly explained by investors hedging the
risk associated with a called convertible bond. As mentioned earlier, one way to hedge this risk is
by short selling the stock. Therefore, the next section examines whether there is a time pattern in
the number of shares sold short, and whether the short selling is related to the call.
5.3 The short interest
Earlier, it was described how short selling is expected to be related to convertible bond calls. Firstly,
we should expect a relation between the short selling of stock, the call announcement, and the
importance of hedging. Secondly, we should not only expect short selling to happen in connection
with underwritten calls. Thirdly, it is expected that the amount of short selling is correlated with
the size of the call. Finally, we should expect to nd a relation between the announcement eect
29
and the amount of short selling. This section will examine the rst three of these relations by
looking at the monthly short interest numbers. The next subsection will relate the announcement
eect to the short selling.
Table VI presents summary statistics on the relative sizes of the short interest numbers. The
table lists the short interest three months before the call (SI
 3
), the short interest associated with
the call (SI
at call
), and the rst short interest number from after the last conversion day (SI
+1
).
In the rst three rows, the short interest numbers are scaled by the number of shares outstanding
before the call, and in the last three rows by the number of new shares to be issued upon conversion.
Mean (%) Median (%) Min (%) Max (%) t-test p-value (%)
SI
 3
SO
2.13 1.06 0.00 30.30 1.61 5.41
SI
at call
SO
2.80 1.34 0.00 33.01
SI
+1
SO
1.05 0.43 0.00 10.86  10:31 < 0:01
SI
 3
New
15.94 9.29 0.00 77.45 2.71 0.35
SI
at call
New
21.80 12.97 0.00 89.81
SI
+1
New
7.88 3.90 0.00 63.34  18:60 < 0:01
Table VI: Descriptive statistics for the short interest data for the 380 convertible bond calls in the period
1963-1995 and the corresponding tests for changes in the short interest around the calls. The rst three rows
in the table measure the short interest relative to the total number of shares outstanding, SO, while the last
three rows measure the short interest relative to the number of new shares, New, to be issued upon a full
conversion of the bonds. The t-tests test if there is a dierence between the short selling at the time of the
call (SI
at call
) and the short selling in month  3 (SI
 3
) and in month +1 (SI
+1
) respectively. The t-test is
the standard one-sided test of the dierence between means using matched pairs. In order to avoid problems
when scaling with the number of new shares caused by small calls with a low number of new shares to be
issued, it is required in the second part of the table that the call will lead to an increase of at least 2.5% in
the number of shares outstanding. This reduces the number of calls to 327.
In earlier sections, the short interest associated with the call was argued to be SI
0
. However,
due to the data available there are some possible problems with SI
0
as a measure of the short selling
caused by the call. First of all, with monthly numbers and many conversion periods shorter than
a month, there are many calls for which no short interest number is available from the conversion
period. Therefore, we have chosen to dene the short interest SI
at call
associated with the call
announcement as SI
0
when SI
0
is available and SI
 1
when it is not. Another problem, described
in footnote 29, is that the calculation date for SI
0
may be close to the end of the conversion period
30
for some of the bonds that will have a short interest number from the conversion period. Finally,
as described in section 3.4 there may be reasons for an early close-out of the short positions, which
also will make it diÆcult to measure the short selling at the call. This means that even though a
SI
0
number is available, it may be a poor measure of the short selling associated with the call.
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From Table VI it follows that the short interest around the call is on average 2.8% of the total
number of shares outstanding and 21.8% of the new shares to be issued.
38
The amount of short
selling varies both relative to the number of shares outstanding and relative to the number of new
shares to be issued upon conversion. In both cases, the minimum corresponds to the case where
there is no short selling at all. Relative to the number of shares outstanding, the maximum short
selling is around 30%, while it is around 80% relative to the number of new shares. The maximum
column illustrates that for some calls, it is possible that the number of shares sold short will stay
at a high level even after the end of the conversion period. This indicates that there probably are
calls where the short selling of stock is not due to the call alone. Another explanation for short
selling around convertible bond calls may be that sometimes a call is triggered by a possible merger
or acquisition and that some short sellers are betting on the outcome of such corporate events.
To examine short selling even further, Figure 4 plots the time pattern for the three quartiles
and the mean of the short interest numbers divided by the number of shares outstanding before the
call. Table VI and the gure clearly demonstrate a pattern in the short interest numbers. There
is an increase in the short selling before the call and a highly signicant decline after the call.
Because the decline in the short interest is so pronounced at the end of the conversion period, the
short selling must primarily be associated with the call itself and not with other corporate events
as mentioned above. However, as described in section 3.4, in theory we should have expected an
increase in the short selling from month  1 to month 0. It follows from section 3.1, that this is
because the holder of a called convertible bond is expected to delay the conversion decision until the
end of the conversion period. Such a delay in conversion implies that the hedging positions should
be maintained until the end of the conversion period, and the increase in short selling associated
37
Some of the problems with SI
at call
may suggest that max[SI
 1
; SI
0
] is used instead as the short interest asso-
ciated with the call. All the following analyzes of the short selling have been made using this measure. However,
this change of measure did not alter any of the main conclusions but improved the level of signicance of some of the
results.
38
When dividing by the number of new shares, we restrict the analysis to the calls that lead to an increase of at
least 2.5% in the number of shares outstanding, i.e. we exclude clean-up calls. This helps avoid the problem that
might exist when the short interest is divided by a small number of new shares to be issued. One example is a
call that leads to only 19.000 new shares being issued. For this call, the short interest is around 2 million shares
corresponding to more than one hundred times the new shares to be issued. In addition, the pattern in the short
interest seems to be unaected by the call.
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with the announcement of the call should be seen as an increase in SI
 1
to SI
0
. Figure 4 shows no
such increase from month  1 to month 0. There are several explanations for the observed pattern.
As mentioned above one problem is that SI
0
can be a poor measure of the increase in short selling
caused by the call. Another problem is that the calculation of the quartiles and the mean of the
short interest numbers for month 0 is based on fewer observations than the other months. This is
because SI
0
is not available for one third of the calls.
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Figure 4: The average and the quartiles of the scaled short interests in % of the number of shares outstanding.
The numbers for month 0 denote the rst short interest number in the conversion period. If the short interest
number for month 0 is not available, the stock is not used in the calculation of the average and quartiles for
month 0.
It follows from section 3.1 that several characteristics of the call are expected to inuence the
conversion behavior of the bondholders and hence also the short selling of stock. One such charac-
teristic is related to the conversion right. The importance of hedging is expected to be negatively
related to the extent to which the conversion right is in-the-money measured by the conversion value
divided by the call payment (the moneyness). To examine this relation, the data-set is divided into
four groups, where group 1 is the 25% of the data-set with the lowest value of the conversion value
divided by the call payment, group 2 is the next 25%, and so forth. For each of these groups, Figure
5 plots the time pattern of the short interest.
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Figure 5: The average scaled short interest for the data-set divided into four groups dependent on the
moneyness of the conversion right. Group 1 is the group with the lowest moneyness, group 4 is the one with
the highest moneyness. The short interest numbers are scaled by the number of new shares to be issued
from conversion and therefore, again it is required that
New
SO
> 2:5% .
Figure 5 reveals some dierences in the time pattern of short interest between the groups. The
four groups are seen especially to dier with respect to the change in the short interest from month
 1 to 0. Group 1 now shows a clear increase and for the other groups the decline from month
 1 to month 0 increases through the groups. This is as expected. A conversion right that is just
in-the-money should make short selling more pronounced and persistent and therefore it is more
likely that SI
0
will capture an increase in the short selling at the announcement of the call.
Table VII presents a more detailed examination of the changes in the short interest from Figure
5. For the calls with a short interest number for month 0, the table presents the number of calls
with SI
0
> SI
 1
and the number of calls with SI
0
> SI
+1
for the four groups and the total sample.
The pattern in the table corresponds to the pattern in Figure 5. Only group 1 has an signicant
increase in the short interest number from month  1 to month 0. For the other groups, around
half of the short interest numbers actually increase even though Figure 5 shows a large decline in
the short interest numbers from month  1 to month 0. The decline in the short selling from month
0 to month +1 is clear and highly signicant for all groups. If, because of measurement problems,
the large decline seen between SI
0
and SI
+1
for some calls happens between SI
 1
and SI
0
, this
can explain the overall decline for three of the four groups in Figure 5 even though around half of
the call actually shows an increase in the short selling associated with the announcement.
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Group (#Obs) #SI
0
> SI
 1
Bin-prob #SI
0
> SI
+1
Bin-prob
1 (70) 47 0.3% 65 < 0:1%
2 (70) 37 36.0% 64 < 0:1%
3 (70) 28 96.4% 63 < 0:1%
4 (70) 29 94.0% 49 < 0:1%
All (280) 141 47.6% 241 < 0:1%
Table VII: Comparison of the short interest around the calls for the total data-set and for the data-set
divided into four groups dependent on the extent to which the conversion right is in-the-money measured
by the conversion value divided by the call payment. Group 1 is the group with the lowest value while
group 4 is the one with the highest value of the conversion value divided by the call payment. Calls without
any short interest for month 0 are excluded. #Obs refers to the number of observations in the dierent
groups. Bin-prob is the probability of drawing at least the observed number of increases under the binomial
distribution with probability 0.5 and #Obs trials.
All in all, the above provides strong evidence that the time pattern in the short selling of
stock is related to the call and that the call leads to a large decrease in the number of shares sold
short. This evidence not only supports a hedging induced price pressure but provides in addition
strong evidence against the bad-news explanation adding to the evidence presented in for example
Ederington and Goh (2001). If a convertible bond call was viewed as bad news about the rm, we
should have expected a more permanent increase in the short selling after the call rather than the
observed decrease.
In general, a possible underwriter will not be appointed until closely before the call, and hence,
the underwriter is only expected to be short selling in a short period around the call. Therefore,
the time pattern indicates that short selling is not due to an underwriter alone. We can examine
this even further by testing if there is a relation between short selling at the time of the call and
an underwriting dummy U
i
, which is 1 if the call is underwritten and 0 if it is not.
39
We test this
by running the following regression
(SI
at call
)
i
New
i
= 
0
+ 
1
U
i
+ 
i
;
where (SI
at call
)
i
and New
i
are as dened above. Because we are dividing by the number of new
39
Several other regressions have been performed in order to examine the relation between short selling and whether
the call is underwritten or not. None of these provided any evidence for a signicant relation between short selling
and the underwriting dummy.
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shares to be issued, we again require that
New
SO
> 2:5%. The results of the regression are:
^

0
= 0:2196
^

1
=  0:0246
(t = 13:48) (t =  0:91)
(p < 0:1%) (p = 36:3%)
These results provide no evidence that short selling should only be relevant for the underwritten
calls. Instead, it shows an insignicant negative relation between short selling and the underwriting
dummy. This is consistent with the argument that the convertible hedge desks also are short selling
stock in connection with convertible bond calls. However, the negative coeÆcient on short selling
may also indicate that the short interest numbers especially for the underwritten calls are poor
measures of the short selling associated with the call. As mentioned earlier, the underwriter in
particular may have incentives to convert as soon as possible and thereby close out a short position
early in the conversion period.
Having demonstrated a pattern in the short selling around a convertible bond call, we will now
examine whether the number of shares sold short is related to the bond called. First of all, one
should expect a positive relation between a measure of the size of the call and the short interest.
The number chosen as a measure of the size of the call is the number of new shares that would be
issued if all bonds outstanding were converted. SI
at call
is again used as the short interest number
of the call. Furthermore, because we are only interested in the increase in the short interest caused
by the call, we subtract the short interest in month +1 from this short interest number. This is
done under the assumption that the short interest number in month +1 represents the normal level
due to other reasons for short selling.
To avoid a possible eect from both the short interest and the number of new shares to be
issued being positively related to the number of shares outstanding, we divide by the number of
shares outstanding before the call.
40
Figure 6 plots the relation between the short interest and the
number of new shares to be issued.
To examine if there is a positive relation, we run the regression
(SI
at call
  SI
+1
)
i
SO
i
= 
0
+ 
1
New
i
SO
i
+ 
i
; (3)
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We obtain similar results if we do not subtract SI
+1
, or if we do not divide by the number of shares outstanding.
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where SO
i
and New
i
are as dened earlier. The results of the regression are:
^

0
=  0:0019
^

1
= 0:1918
(t =  0:78) (t = 9:23)
(p = 43:8%) (p < 0:1%)
Adj:R
2
= 0:26:
These results show a highly signicant positive relation between the short interest at the time
of the call and the new shares to be issued. From the regression, we obtain the interesting result
that the total number of shares sold short on average corresponds to at least 19% of the new shares.
However, from Figure 6 we also observe a large cross sectional variation in the amount of short
selling. This may be caused by several factors. Firstly, the monthly data on the short interest do
not perfectly measure the short interest associated with the call. Secondly, for calls with a high
fraction of new shares relative to the shares outstanding, it may be diÆcult to borrow the shares
required in order to short sell. Hence, for the large calls, there may not be as much short selling as
expected. Finally, it may simply be that not all convertible bondholders react to a call as explained
in this paper. There may for example be convertible bond issues where the original bondholders do
not sell the convertible bonds when the call is announced but instead keep the new shares received
from the conversion. There may also be convertible bond issues like private placements where the
bonds are not traded and hence, no short selling should be expected for these calls.
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Figure 6: Cross sectional plot of the short interest induced by the call against the number of new shares to
be issued upon conversion, both scaled by the number of shares outstanding before the call announcement.
As a measure of the short interest induced by the call is used
SI
at call
 SI
+1
SO
.
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5.4 Hedging induced announcement eect
So far we have provided evidence for an announcement eect, a subsequent price recovery, and
showed that the short selling is related to the call. A nal step is now to examine if we can explain
the announcement eect by hedging. One point to examine is if there is a relation between the
announcement eect and the increase in short selling. As a proxy for an increase in the short interest
at the call announcement, one can use SI
0
  SI
 1
for the calls where SI
0
exists. A cross plot of
the announcement eect, CAR
 1:0
, against the increase in short interest calculated as
SI
0
 SI
 1
SO
provides only weak evidence for a relation between the short interest pattern and the announcement
eect. Only for calls with an increase in the short interest number from month  1 to month 0, are
there some evidence for the expected negative relation between the announcement eect and the
increase in the short interest.
In an attempt to avoid the problem with the short interest number from month 0, we can instead
use SI
 1
as a measure of the short selling that has occurred already before the announcement. In
this case, we should expect a positive relation between the announcement eect and SI
 1
. This is
because a high amount of short selling before the call will imply a small amount of additional short
selling at the announcement and hence a less negative announcement eect.
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One case where SI
 1
especially is expected to be high is when the call is expected by the market. The reason is that
the increased equity risk of the convertible bond would then have led to additional short selling
before the call. If, as argued in the previous sections, the announcement eect is due to a hedging-
induced price pressure, we should expect that several other variables would help explain the cross
sectional variation in the announcement eect. Firstly, a large fraction of new shares to be issued
upon conversion relative to the number of shares outstanding is expected to be associated with
more price pressure and hence with a more negative announcement eect. This predicts a negative
relation between the announcement eect and the size of the call. Secondly, if the conversion
right is deep in-the-money, the incentive to hedge may be weak. Therefore, a positive relation is
expected between the announcement eect and a measure of the conversion value relative to the
call payment. Thirdly, in the case of underwritten calls, hedging performed by the underwriter as
41
If, as above, we instead used SI
 1
  SI
+1
as a measure of the short selling, the sign on the eect from short
selling in Table VIII remains the same but the variable becomes slightly less signicant. Primarily two factors may
explain this dierence. Firstly, by subtracting SI
+1
we may increase the potential error in the short interest number
and this way nding a signicant relation is less likely. Secondly, by subtracting SI
+1
and thereafter dividing by
the number of new shares to be issued, a few observations become quite negative, which does not make sense in this
setting. Furthermore, it can be argued that SI
 1
is the appropriate measure of short selling in connection with the
call. This is because a high level of short selling before the call can make the short selling of additional shares more
diÆcult.
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described in section 3.4 may lead to additional price pressure which may not be captured by the
short selling measure. This predicts a negative relation between the announcement eect and a
dummy variable, which is one for underwritten calls and zero otherwise. Finally, the expectation
at the time of the call of the volatility of stock prices in the conversion period may be relevant
for the incentive to hedge and should therefore be relevant in explaining the announcement eect.
A higher volatility will increase the incentive to hedge and therefore the announcement eect is
expected to be negatively related to the volatility.
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In order to examine the relation between the announcement eect and the variables described,
we run the cross sectional regression
CAR
i; 1:0
= 
0
+ 
1
(SI
 1
)
i
New
i
+ 
2
New
i
SO
i
+ 
3
CV
i
  CP
i
CP
i
+ 
4
U
i
+ 
5
^
i
+ 
i
; (4)
where CV
i
is the conversion value, CP
i
is the call payment for bond i, and U
i
is an underwriting
dummy. The underwriting dummy is 1 if the call is underwritten and 0 if it is not. ^
i
is the
volatility of stock prices for bond i estimated in the conversion period. As before, we only use
observations with
New
SO
> 2:5% in the regression, i.e. we exclude the clean-up calls. Results from
the individual regressions and the joint regression in (4) are given in Table VIII, where the joint
regression only includes variables that are signicant in the individual regressions.
From rows 1{5 in Table VIII it follows that the signs on all the estimated coeÆcients are as
predicted by the hypothesis that the announcement eect is caused by a hedging-induced price
pressure. The short selling variable calculated from the monthly data is signicantly positive
with a p-value of 1.9% meaning that more short selling before the call leads to a less negative
announcement eect. The size of the call, the degree in-the-money and the underwriting dummy
are all signicant with p-values less than 2%. Surprisingly, the volatility turns out to be insignicant.
Row 6 documents that the short selling and the underwriting dummy are both signicant at the
5% level in a joint regression. Row 8 includes all variables that are signicant in the individual
regressions. The size and the degree in-the-money of the conversion right are both highly signicant
whereas the p-values for short selling and the underwriting dummy now have increased to 4.3%
and 19.0% respectively. If the volatility is included in the joint regression, it is insignicant with a
p-value of 24% without changing the conclusions from row 8.
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There are of course no data on the expected volatility. Therefore, we have used the volatility of stock prices
estimated in the conversion period as a proxy for the expected volatility. However, the results are qualitatively the
same if instead we use the stock price volatility estimated from day  150 to day  50. Alternatively, we could have
used other measures such as the arbitrage risk measure used in Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2000) to measure the
incentive to hedge. We have here chosen to use the volatility because it is the volatility which measures the total risk
and which is the relevant risk measure when pricing the conversion option.
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Row Intercept Short selling Size of Moneyness Underwritten Volatility
call
(Adj:R
2
)
^

0
^

1
^

2
^

3
^

4
^

5
1  0:0220 0:0210 | | | |
(1.7%) ( 9:0; < 1%) (2:4; 1:9%)
2  0:0114 |  0:0478 | | |
(4.8%) ( 4:7; < 1%) ( 3:8; < 1%)
3  0:0224 | | 0:0106 | |
(2.6%) ( 9:5; < 1%) (2:8; 0:5%)
4  0:0149 | | |  0:0086 |
(2.0%) ( 6:9; < 1%) ( 2:4; 1:9%)
5  0:0113 | | | |  0:0155
(1.4%) ( 2:6; 1%) ( 1:4; 18%)
6  0:0189 0:0197 | |  0:0081 |
(3.1%) ( 6:7; < 1%) (2:2; 2:8%) ( 2:2; 2:6%)
7  0:0244 | | 0:0125 |  0:0306
(3.8%) ( 4:11; < 1%) (3:3; 0:1%) ( 2:2; 2:7%)
8  0:0177 0:0177  0:0421 0:0088  0:0047 |
(8.4%) ( 4:2; < 1%) (2:04; 4:3%) ( 3:4; < 1%) (2:4; 1:8%) ( 1:3; 19%)
Table VIII: Results from the regression given in equation (4). Short selling refers to
SI
 1
New
, Size of call is
New
SO
, Moneyness denotes
CV CP
CP
, Underwritten is a dummy which is one for underwritten calls and zero
otherwise, Volatility is ^. SI
 1
is the short interest number from the month before the announcement, New
is the number of new shares to be issued upon conversion, SO is the number of shares outstanding before
the announcement, CV is the conversion value, and CP is the call payment. ^
i
is the volatility of stock
prices in the conversion period. The brackets list (t-statistics,p-value) for the standard test for signicance
of the estimated coeÆcients. Only observations with
New
SO
> 2:5% are used.
The changes in the level of signicance for some of the variables between the individual regres-
sions and the joint regression may be explained by multicollinearity in the regression. From Figure
6, we already know that there is a positive relation between short selling and the size of the call.
Similarly, it turns out that there are several interesting correlations between other of the variables.
Short selling is negatively correlated with degree in-the-money, and the degree in-the-money and
stock volatility have a strong positive correlation signicant at the 1% level, which provides an
explanation for the results about the stock volatility in the regression. A higher stock volatility is
associated with a deeper in-the-money conversion right.
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Therefore, the eect of higher volatility
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This is also consistent with the argument that the calling rms are averse to the risk of a failed conversion.
Therefore, a higher stock volatility will lead the rm to delay the call even further until the conversion value according
to the rm is suÆciently above the call payment or as concluded in Asquith (1995): \the required safety premium
appears to be a function of stock price volatility."
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on hedging is partly oset by the eect of the conversion right being deeper in-the-money, which
leads the stock volatility only to be signicant in a joint regression including the degree in-the-
money as seen from row 7.
Similarly, we can briey examine the use of underwriters in further detail. A regression of the
underwriting dummy on a constant and the moneyness gives a negative relation signicant at the
1% level, whereas a regression of the underwriting dummy on a constant and the magnitude of
the call gives a positive coeÆcient on the magnitude, signicant at the 5% level. In addition to
documenting potential problems of multicollinearity as mentioned above, these regression results
provide an interesting insight regarding the use of underwriters. The moneyness of underwritten
calls is lower than that of non-underwritten calls whereas the magnitude is larger. For underwritten
calls, the conversion value is on average 30.1% above the call payment whereas the same number
for non-underwritten calls is 53.6%. This indicates that the use of an underwriter gives the calling
rm the ability to call earlier, but the calls are still delayed until the conversion right is quite deep
in-the-money. Because of risk aversion, the underwriters are simply not willing to underwrite the
call unless there is a safety premium of a certain size.
6 Implications and Further Research
This paper has several important implications for the way one understands optimal behavior within
investment banks. The paper has provided evidence that both convertible hedge desks and under-
writers are willing to accept relatively high costs of hedging. By short selling underpriced stock,
these investment banks in addition to the trading costs incur an average monthly costs correspond-
ing to 1.75% in abnormal returns, and 2.74% in normal returns on the short positions.
This is surprising because investment banks are expected to behave as if they have a `portfolio'
of investments and only hedge systematic risk. Therefore, the results in this paper raise a main
question: Why are convertible hedge desks and underwriters willing to accept such high costs of
hedging?
Based on the information we have obtained from several conversations with investment banks,
the answer is related to the evaluation structure, risk aversion, and the possible agency conicts at
several levels within these banks. Since performance evaluation is done on a deal-by-deal basis, the
employees (dealers) are prevented from considering convertible bond calls as a `diversied portfolio'
of deals where only the systematic risk should be considered. Instead, the employees are induced
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to care also about the total risk and accept the costs of hedging total risk rather than just the
costs of hedging the systematic risk. The costs of being unhedged can simply be too high for the
individual employee.
This study also provides some information about the optimal behavior of underwriters. The
underwriters are also willing to accept the costs associated with hedging. The reason is again that
the underwriters also seem to evaluate each underwriting deal on an individual basis. Hence, risk
aversion and the evaluation structure are also important factors in explaining the behavior of un-
derwriters. In addition, these `limits of arbitrage' provide an explanation for why underwriting fees
are found to be so high.
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The fees need to cover the costly hedging performed by the underwriters.
According to the eÆcient market assumption, abnormal returns should be eliminated by the
action of a large number of eectively risk neutral arbitrageurs. However, the `arbitrageurs' that
are involved in convertible bond calls and understand the stock price pattern around the calls are
risk averse and highly specialized. Hence, this paper has shown that there are limits of arbitrage as
arbitrage fails to bring stock prices close to fundamentals around the call announcement. Actually,
in the case of convertible bond calls these limits of arbitrage can be argued to force prices even
further below fundamental values. This is because the limits of arbitrage are the cause of the short
selling of stock that leads to the short term distortion of stock prices.
The study's results suggest that a deeper understanding of the optimal behavior of investment
banks requires an understanding of optimal compensation schemes, risk aversion, and agency prob-
lems within the rms that short sell in response to calls. Therefore, further research should be
directed towards learning more about the evaluations within investment banks and hence provide
understanding of each employee's opportunity set and the determinants of the preferences over this
set. This would help to provide an improved understanding of the limits of arbitrage.
7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has considered the behavior of investment banks around convertible bond calls. Evidence
was provided that convertible hedge desks and a possible underwriter short sell stock at the time
of the call as a means of hedging the increased equity risk.
One major insight of the paper is that the pattern in the number of shares sold short is related
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Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) nd that the standby fee alone on average corresponds to 1.05% of the face
amount of the issue outstanding. If the take-up fee is included, the total underwriting fee is on average 4.19% of the
face amount of issue outstanding.
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to the call. Furthermore, it was shown that the short selling of stock at least in part can explain
the pattern in stock prices around the call consistent with a hedging-induced price pressure. For
example, the announcement eect was linked to the short selling of stock, to whether the call is
underwritten or not, to the size of the call, and to the extent to which the conversion right is
in-the-money.
The nding of short selling of stocks with positive abnormal returns in the conversion period
raises a main question: Why do arbitrageurs (convertible hedge desks) and underwriters short stocks
that are underpriced on average? The proposed answer is that this is due to `the limits of arbitrage'
as considered in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Risk aversion and the related evaluation structure
within these investment banks prevent the employees from considering calls at the diversied level
where only systematic risk matters. Instead, the employees have to care about total risk. With
such an evaluation structure, it is clear why the risk associated with an unhedged position can be
too high. As one employee in an investment bank put it, when asked if he would not prefer to be
unhedged rather than to short sell underpriced stock:
: : : it is required that you hedge, and therefore you short sell,
while another answered:
: : : your advice sounds like a career-destroying move!
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A Hedging at the time of the call
In section 3.4, it was argued that the announcement eect may be due to a price pressure caused
by an increase in the hedge ratio associated with the convertible bonds.
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In order to examine this
further, this appendix will consider how the hedge ratio changes when the bond is called.
In order to examine this, we will use the contingent claim pricing set-up as proposed in Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) to derive the value of the convertible debt before and after
the call is announced. In this set-up, the total value, V
t
, of the rm is assumed to follow a geometric
Brownian motion given by
dV
t
= dt+ V
t
dB
t
;
where B
t
is a standard Brownian motion. Under standard assumptions, it is then possible to use
contingent claim pricing to obtain prices for dierent elements in the capital structure. We now
assume that the rm consists only of equity and a non-interest bearing callable convertible bond
convertible into V
t
of the rm with a maturity payment of B. Furthermore, if we assume that the
market does not expect the bond to be called, the value of the uncalled convertible bond is given
by
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h
1
=
ln(B exp( r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1
2

2


p

:
Here  denotes the time to maturity for the bond, i.e. the time until B is due.  is the cumulative
normal distribution function.
If the conversion right is in-the-money and the bond is suddenly called, the value of the bond
will be given by the conversion value plus a put option as described in section 3.1. The put option
is the right to put the bond to the rm for the call payment, here assumed to be B, so the put
option has an exercise value of B and on average a month to maturity; i.e. the value of the called
convertible bond is given by
D
C
c
(V
t
; t) = V
t
+BS
put
(V
t
; t; 
put
; B): (A.2)
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By hedge ratio, we here mean the delta ratio, i.e. the number of shares that should be sold short in order to
hedge against changes in the stock prices.
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Ingersoll (1977a).
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We can now use (A.1) and (A.2) to establish how sensitive the value of the convertible is to changes
in the rm value before and after the call. By dierentiating (A.1) and (A.2) with respect to V
t
,
we get
@D
C
uc
@V
t
= 1  (d
1
) + ( h
1
+
ln 

p

) (A.3a)
@D
C
c
@V
t
= ( h
put
1
): (A.3b)
To illustrate the dierence between these two, we consider a numerical example with the fol-
lowing parameters:
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B = 30  = 0:2  = 0:22
 = 5 
put
= 0:01 r = 0:07:
Figure 7 shows the two derivatives in (A.3a) and (A.3b) as a function of the rm value V . Since
 = 0:20 and B = 30, the convertible bond will be in-the-money when V  B= = 150.
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Figure 7: The hedge ratio with respect to the rm value for called and uncalled convertible bonds. The
conversion right will be in-the-money when V  150.
From the gure follows that when the bond is more than 6% in-the-money, a call will make the
convertible bond more sensitive to changes in the rm value. The investors in the convertible hedge
desks that we talked to argued that they only hedge the risk associated with the conversion value
and leave the put option open. In this case, the hedge ratio will increase from the solid uncalled
line to the horizontal line at 0.2.
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The conclusions in this appendix are not sensitive to the choice of these parameters.
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B The event study
Part of this paper uses an event study to examine the stock price eect of call announcements.
Therefore, this appendix includes a brief description of the event study and the related tests. A
description of event studies can also be found in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), but some of
the tests used in this paper will be slightly dierent from the tests described there. This is because
we want to test for signicance of abnormal returns over conversion periods with dierent lengths.
A test taking this into account is described in for example Mikkelson and Partch (1988).
The event study is used to examine the stock price reaction to the call announcements. This
is done by calculating the abnormal return for the period with the announcement. Assuming that
normal stock returns are generated according to the market model, the abnormal return for rm i
on day t is obtained as
AR
it
= R
it
  (
i
+ 
i
R
mt
); (B.4)
where
R
it
= Stock return for rm i on day t (B.5)
R
mt
= Return on day t for a market index: (B.6)
The parameters in the market model are estimated for rm i by running the ordinary least
squares regression
R
it
= 
i
+ 
i
R
mt
+ 
it
; (B.7)
using stock returns from the so-called estimation period. The estimation period should be separated
from the event period. In addition, for convertible bond calls, the estimation period should be after
the call announcement as explained in footnote 24.
The cumulative abnormal return, CAR
i;
i
1
:
i
2
, for stock i from time 
i
1
to 
i
2
is now given as
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1
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i
2
=

i
2
X
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i
1
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: (B.8)
Assume now that we have N observations of abnormal stock returns over the considered time
period. The cumulative average abnormal return, CAR, over the time period 
1
to 
2
for the N
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stocks is then given as
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Tests for signicance of the abnormal returns over period 
1
to 
2
are based on the following
asymptotic normal distributed test statistic:
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In (B.11), the variables are given by
L
i
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1
+ 1; i.e. the length of the time period under consideration
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In addition to the parametric tests described above, it can be worthwhile applying nonpara-
metric tests. Nonparametric tests will be free of specic assumptions about the distribution of
abnormal returns and will make it possible to check the robustness of the conclusions from the
parametric tests. The sign test is such a nonparametric test. The basis of the sign test is that if the
abnormal returns for a period are insignicant, it is equally probable that the abnormal returns are
positive or negative. If we let N
+
be the number of positive CAR
i;
i
1
:
i
2
and let N be the number
of observations, then the statistic
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will be asymptotically normal distributed.
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We will here allow for the case where the considered time periods for the individual stocks have dierent lengths.
Therefore, by 
1
to 
2
we mean that the time period for stock i is 
i
1
to 
i
2
.
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Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, p. 172).
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